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Abstract 
Mexican gas stations across the country buy and sell gasoline at regulated common prices. 
Therefore, authorities that set these prices do not take into account competition conditions of each 
market. In this paper we establish the effect of a regulated mark-up price as well as competition 
on the incentives that gas stations in Mexico have to dispense less amount of gasoline than what 
consumers pay for. The results of theoretical and empirical work indicate that a higher regulated 
mark-up price reduces the incentives of gas stations to cheat. Similarly, more intense competition 
among the retailers of a given market decreases the average shortage. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The gasoline industry in Mexico is highly regulated. There is only one brand and no price 
competition exists. All retail stations buy and sell gasoline distributed by the state-owned oil 
company Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) at fixed common prices. These prices are determined 
by the ministry of finance, Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público (SHCP). In addition, the 
official consumer agency, Procuraduría Federal del Consumidor (PROFECO), inspects pumps at 
gas stations to verify that they meet official norms. Among other things, they verify that station 
pumps dispense the correct amount of gasoline and that the product meets the announced quality 
standards.1 
In spite of PROFECO’s inspecting efforts, many consumers believe that they do not get 
all the gas they pay for. According to PROFECO (2005), more than 60% of consumers believe 
retail gas stations do not dispense the correct amount of gasoline and almost 40% say they have 
had some problem with retail service. The problem that these consumers report more frequently 
(61.9%) is getting less amount of gasoline than what they pay for. In Mexico, this practice by 
retailers is called selling “incomplete liters”. 
The perception of consumers is not wrong. The results of PROFECO’s periodic 
inspections indicate that dispensing incomplete liters is a common practice. Furthermore, the 
results of the field study “Programa del Consumidor Simulado” (PCS) show that there is at least 
one gas station dispensing less gasoline than what consumers pay for in 54.4% of municipalities 
included in the sample. According to this study, the maximum shortage represents 15% of the 
amount requested by consumers.    
                                                 
1 There are two types of gasoline in Mexico: Magna (87 octanes) and Premium (93 octanes).  
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In the absence of price regulation, even if there is only one brand, it would be expected to 
find price variation in different gasoline stations across the country or at different places in the 
cities depending on particular local market conditions. The fact that gasoline prices are set by 
SHCP does not imply lack of incentives for gas stations to charge higher prices in certain markets 
and that they actually do it. However, gasoline stations in Mexico are unable to set prices openly. 
Although in principle all gas stations charge the official price, it is important to 
understand that stations that sell incomplete liters actually charge a higher price. Prices of 
divisible goods are set in terms of standard measures of volume like liters or gallons. For 
instance, if a retail station in Mexico sells unleaded gasoline at 7.96 pesos per liter, the official 
price in February of 2010, but dispenses 900 milliliters instead, then the actual price is slightly 
above 8.84 pesos per liter. Consequently, the station is charging 88 cents over the price. 
Since gas stations can charge a higher price indirectly by dispensing incomplete liters, one 
would expect to find a relation between the variables that affect the equilibrium price in a flexible 
price environment and the size of the fraud or overprice. For example, under a flexible price 
scheme, stations facing less competition tend to set higher prices than other stations that have 
more competitors. This is the way in which firms respond to market conditions. However, given 
that prices are fixed, Mexican stations that face less competition would have more incentive to 
increase prices by dispensing incomplete liters than other stations facing more competition. 
This paper extends the model developed by Salop (1979) to study the incentives that 
gasoline stations have to sell incomplete liters. In addition, it uses information of the PCS 
published by PROFECO to test the predictions of the model. Among other things, the model 
predicts that gas stations have less incentive to sell incomplete liters if competition is more 
intense and the regulated mark-up price is higher. Finally, the results of empirical work are 
consistent with these predictions. 
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Next section reviews works related with illegal activity, as well as studies about gasoline 
markets. Sections III and IV are devoted to develop and analyze the theoretical model, 
respectively. Section V presents empirical work to test the predictions of the model. Finally, 
section VI concludes.     
  
II. BACKGROUND 
 
The problem of gas stations that dispense less gasoline than what consumers pay for has 
not been addressed directly in the economic literature. However, there is abundant work on three 
areas that are related to this problem. The first area includes economic studies about crime. The 
second area is conformed by theoretical work about competition and prices. Finally, the third area 
includes empirical literature about price competition in gasoline markets of the US and Canada. 
Although in economic terms selling incomplete liters can be considered equivalent to 
increasing the price, it is not right from a moral perspective and it may be illegal.2 This practice 
allows firms to obtain higher profits under certain circumstances but can result in punishment by 
the authorities and social discredit. Firms are supposed to evaluate the advantages related to 
overprice taking into account the cost of punishment and the probability of being caught.3 If the 
expected cost of punishment is not sufficiently high, firms have economic incentives to 
overprice. However, as explained by Levitt and Dubner (2006), in addition to economic 
incentives there are moral and social incentives. Some firm owners or managers do not sell 
                                                 
2 Aguilar (2006) explains that the allowed tolerance in Norm 005, which establishes the way in which PROFECO 
verifies gas station pumps, is 100 milliliters per 20 liters.  
3 The seminal paper by Becker (1968) explores these issues in detail. 
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incomplete liters because they consider it wrong or they fear social discredit in case they are 
caught. 
In mainstream economic theory there is an inverse relation between price and the number 
of firms in the market. The extension of Cournot’s model in Tirole (1988) is useful to explore the 
whole range between monopoly and perfect competition. In this model, considering that all firms 
have the same cost structure, each additional entrant generates a lower equilibrium price.4 
Another line of argument that supports the negative relation between prices and competition is 
the possibility of collusion. Bain (1951) says that having a small number of firms in the industry 
facilitates collusion. In this sense, Geithman, Marvel and Weiss (1981) say that there can be a 
critical number of firms for collusion and that this number depends on particular conditions of 
each industry. 
There are several papers that relate gasoline prices with the characteristics of the product 
and local market conditions. Among others, it is possible to highlight the empirical work of 
Marvel (1978), Barron et al. (2004), Barron et al. (2008) and Sen (2003). The results in these 
papers are consistent with mainstream economic theory. That is, they find an inverse relationship 
between prices and competition. 
Marvel (1978) studies the relationship between average gasoline prices in 22 US 
metropolitan areas and the Herfindahl index to determine whether firms collude in these markets. 
Among other things, Marvel finds that average prices are higher in markets where the 
concentration index is higher. Similarly, Barron et al. (2004) study the aggregate price level and 
                                                 
4 Stiglitz (1987) develops a model that relates prices and competition taking into account consumer search costs. The 
results of his work are opposed to mainstream economic theory. 
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price dispersion in 4 geographic areas. They find that an increase in the density of sellers reduces 
not only the aggregate price level but also the price dispersion.   
Barron et al. (2008) use field experiment data collected in 54 gasoline stations that 
modified prices exogenously. They identify the effect of competition (that is, the number of 
alternative retailers) over the price elasticity in each of the gas stations that participated in the 
experiment. The results of the experiment indicate that gasoline stations face a more elastic 
demand when they have more competitors. It is important to notice that, holding everything else 
constant, the mark-up of a firm is inversely related to the price elasticity of demand. It follows 
that more competition leads to lower prices. 
Sen (2003) compares the effect of oil international price changes and concentration in the 
local market over the retail prices of gasoline in Canada. According to the results of this analysis, 
oil international prices explain retail prices more than concentration in the local market. 
However, the evidence shows a positive relationship between gasoline prices and market 
concentration. 
 
III. THE MODEL 
 
The model developed by Salop (1979) can be extended to study the incentives that 
gasoline stations in Mexico have to cheat. In order to achieve this purpose, it is important to take 
into account the characteristics of the gasoline market in this country. First, PEMEX supplies 
gasoline to all the retailers in Mexico. Second, there are common fixed buy and sell prices for 
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gasoline in almost every place in the country.5 Hence, it is assumed that all stations buy gasoline 
at the same marginal cost c > 0 and, afterwards, sell it at the official common price p > c. 
Although the official price of gasoline is not controlled by retailers, it is important to keep 
in mind that they can overprice by dispensing incomplete liters. Each retailer decides to do it or 
not depending on its incentives and scrupulosity. It is assumed that retailer i  sets overprice ie  
which consumers are unable to identify with certainty. Hence, iep +  is the actual price 
consumers pay at this station.6 
Following Salop (1979), there exist n firms selling identical goods (gasoline) located 
symmetrically along a circle with perimeter z. The size of this circle represents the size of the 
market. Figure 1 shows the “circular city” and firm i  located at 0. This firm competes directly 
with firms 1−i  and 1+i  located at distance nz  to the left and right hand side, respectively, from 
the firm i . 
 
FIGURE 1.-  Firm i, its nearest competitors and the size of the city 
INSERT FIGURE 1  
 
Consumers are distributed uniformly on the perimeter of the circle and have perfectly 
inelastic unit demands. That is, every point around the circle represents a consumer willing to pay 
                                                 
5 The exceptions to this rule are towns in the border with the US where prices are fixed taking into account prices at 
the other side of the border. 
6 Although ei is called an overprice, this variable may be either positive, negative or zero. 
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any amount of money to have one unit of the good. In addition, consumers pay transportation 
cost t > 0 times the distance to the retailer they choose to buy from.7 
In general, consumers compare retail gasoline stations and decide where to buy under 
uncertainty. For example, in the US and Canada there is uncertainty about the price of gasoline in 
different stations and there are search cost associated with this fact. In contrast, gasoline stations 
in Mexico have a fixed well known price but there is uncertainty about the amount of gasoline 
that consumers actually get in each station and, consequently, about the effective price. It is 
important to say that price flexibility does not eliminate all the incentives that retailers may have 
to cheat. Consumers’ complaints about cheating gas stations do occur in countries where retail 
gasoline prices are flexible.  
Although consumers ignore the exact amount of gasoline that retailers dispense, in order 
to make a decision they must have some expectation about the probability of being cheated and 
the amount of this overprice in the relevant stations. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume 
expectations not distant from reality. In other words, consumers must have some ability to 
discover cheating gas stations and act accordingly. Otherwise, cheating would have no limits. 
Assume that retailers do not cheat all the time. In particular, suppose that with probability 
iq  consumers pay ie  at station i  and that they do not pay it otherwise. For instance, if 2
1=iq  
the gas station i  cheats consumers half of the times but dispenses the full amount of gas the other 
half. 
The expected overprice at retail station i  is ii eq ⋅ . Despite the consumer ignores whether 
he or she will receive the correct amount of gasoline at a given station and occasion, it will be 
                                                 
7 Transportation costs must include the cost of time, money and nuisance that consumers incur when they move from 
one place to another. 
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assumed that the expected overprice at each station is known by consumers. This assumption 
allows consumers to compare retailers and make a rational decision. 
The consumer chooses the best retail station ex-ante, considering that some or all stations 
may overprice. In other words, the consumer may buy in certain station expecting overprice 
because it can cost more to buy in other stations that are far away although the expected overprice 
may be lower.8  
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
In the circular city, as explained by Tirole (1988), each firm competes directly with two 
adjacent firms. The total expected cost for a consumer located at x in the interval ( )nz,0  who 
decides to buy gasoline at the retail station i  is 
txpeq ii ⋅++⋅ . (1) 
Similarly, the expected cost of buying at station 1+i  for the same consumer is 
tx
n
zpeq ii ⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −++⋅ ++ 11 . (2) 
It follows that the consumer who is indifferent between these two stations is located at 
t
eqeq
n
zx iiiic 22
11 ⋅−⋅+= ++ . (3) 
Equation (3) says that the market shares of the two stations are equal as long as their 
expected overprices are the same. In this case, consumers buy at the closest retail service station. 
                                                 
8 In a different context, Png and Reitman (1994) find that consumers in California are willing to pay up to 6% more 
in term of prices in order to avoid waiting time in congested retail stations that price lower. 
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However, each retailer may try to get a larger share of the market reducing the expected 
overprice. 
Suppose that all the direct and indirect rival retailers of firm i  choose to overprice oe  
with probability oq . The demand of firm i  as a function of these variables and its own is    
( )
t
eqeq
n
zeqeqD iiooooiii
⋅−⋅+=,,, . (4) 
The stations choose how much and how frequently they overprice in order to maximize expected 
profits, taking as given the decisions of their rivals. That is, station i  chooses ie  and iq  to 
maximize 
( ) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅−⋅+⋅−+⋅=⋅−+⋅=
t
eqeq
n
zcpeqeqeqDcpeqE iiooiiooiiiiii ,,,π . (5) 
The implicit assumption of equation (5) is that retail stations are risk neutral. That is, they 
maximize expected profits. The first order conditions are 
( ) 0=⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅−⋅++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −⋅−+⋅=∂
∂
i
iiooi
ii
i
i e
t
eqeq
n
z
t
e
cpeq
q
π
 (6) 
 
( ) 0=⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅−⋅++⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −⋅−+⋅=∂
∂
i
iiooi
ii
i
i q
t
eqeq
n
z
t
qcpeq
e
π
 (7) 
Although this optimization problem does not have unique solutions for ie  and iq  
independently, there is a unique solution for the expected overprice ii eq ⋅ . The symmetric 
equilibrium of this game is found setting firm’s i  expected overprice equal to its rivals overprices 
(i.e., ooii eqeq ⋅=⋅ ** ).  In other words, the expected overprice oo eq ⋅  is chosen to eliminate the 
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incentives of any of the firms to modify it unilaterally. In this case, the equilibrium expected 
overprice oo eq ⋅  is  
( )cp
n
zteq oo −−⋅=⋅ . (8) 
The equation above says that the equilibrium expected overprice depends on transportation costs, 
the number of firms, the size of the market, the official price and the marginal cost. Although the 
expected overprice is referred as a positive number, equation (8) allows it to be either positive or 
negative. For instance, if the first term in the right hand side is smaller than the official markup, 
then the overprice is negative. However, it is not difficult to see from equation (5) that expected 
profits are always positive.   
Figure 2 shows the distribution of gasoline shortage in the PCS sample. According to the 
data collected in this sample, the probability that a retailer dispenses the correct amount of 
gasoline is about 63% while the probability that it dispenses short of the amount is about 37%.9 
Although it is common to find retailers dispensing short of the amount and out of the allowed 
tolerance, the shortage tends to be relatively small. Most of the times, the shortage is bellow 10%. 
 
FIGURE 2.-  Distribution of gasoline shortage in the PCS sample 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
Firms can increase (or decrease) the expected overprice either by dispensing incomplete 
liters more frequently or dispensing shorter (or larger) “liters” according to market conditions. 
Although it is relatively simple to determine the direction in which the equilibrium expected 
                                                 
9 There is only one case out of 394 where the retailer dispenses more gasoline than what the simulated consumer 
pays for. 
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overprice changes in response to a change in one of the exogenous variables, it is important to 
highlight the effect of a change in the official mark-up (that is, the difference between the official 
price and marginal cost), as well as a change in the number of firms. Among other things, the 
model predicts that retail gas stations have less incentive to sell incomplete liters if the official 
mark-up is larger and if competition is more intense. 
These results are easy to understand noting that the equilibrium market price in the 
absence of price regulation would be equal to the sum of expected overprice, oo eq ⋅ , and the 
official price, p , as shown in the following equation. 
c
n
ztpeq oo +⋅=+⋅ . (9) 
Since the official price is not controlled by the firms, they have incentives to adjust their 
expected overprices according to the local market conditions that they face. If more competition 
leads to lower prices but firms are not able to modify the official price, they would have 
incentives to reduce the expected overprice or even to make it negative. Similarly, if the authority 
changes the official price and everything else remains unchanged, firms would have incentives to 
adjust the expected overprice in opposite direction to the change in the official price. 
The data suggests that competition in most Mexican markets is not sufficiently intense to 
generate a negative overprice. As mentioned before, in only one out of 394 tests the retailer 
dispenses more gasoline than the amount paid. However, a reasonable explanation for this 
asymmetry is the following. The authority in Mexico actually regulates both retail and wholesale 
prices which implies that all gas stations have the same markup. This markup is low in 
comparison to those in the US where prices are not regulated. The regulated markup in Mexico 
was 5.92 and 6.5% during the period in which the PCS was conducted. According to the data of 
43 US cities in Borenstein and Shepard (1996), the average retail margin was about 15% of the 
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price during the 1986-1991 period. Similarly, the data of 48 states of the US in Deltas (2008) 
implies an average retail margin of 16% during the 1988-2002 period.   
 
V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
The PCS data can be used to evaluate two of the main results of the theoretical model. It 
is important to explain that the PCS is conducted by PROFECO to test specifically whether retail 
stations dispense the amount of gasoline that consumers pay for. When PROFECO conducts the 
PCS, retailers are not aware that they are being tested. However, law prevents the authority to use 
the results of these tests to sanction retailers. That is, this information is produced for statistical 
purposes only. In addition to the PCS, PROFECO verifies retail gasoline stations periodically. 
These verifications may result in sanctions to retailers but inspectors have to identify themselves 
with the retail station personal before they start the procedure. 
The PCS dataset includes 394 tests in 17 states of the country conducted between May of 
2005 and July of 2006. There are 103 municipalities in the sample. Thus, on average each 
municipality is tested 3.8 times. There are some retail gas stations with more than one test. 
However, it is not possible to know whether the same gas pump is chosen when this occurs. 
Table 1 shows the distribution of tests and municipalities in the different regions of the country. 
Note that most of the tests are conducted in the central region of the country but the south region 
includes more municipalities. Finally, there is little information from the north of the country 
both in terms of tests and municipalities.10  
                                                 
10  The states that are included in the north region are Coahuila, Durango and Nuevo León; the states in the central 
region are Guanajuato, México, Michoacán, Morelos, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa and Zacatecas; the states 
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TABLE 1. Distribution of tests and municipalities  
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
The PCS information is used to build two databases. In the first database, the unit of 
observation is the test. In the second database, the unit of observation is the municipality. It will 
become clear later that each of the databases is convenient to test empirically one of the main 
predictions of the theoretical model. However, the two databases can generate different results. 
For instance, if the unit of observation is the test, then 36.5% of the times retail gasoline stations 
dispense incomplete liters. However, if the unit of observation is the municipality, then in 54.4% 
of them there is at least one gasoline station dispensing incomplete liters. Similarly, the 
maximum shortage in a test is 15% but the maximum average shortage in a municipality is 8.3%. 
Finally, it is important to say that the shortage is not correlated with the number of tests 
conducted in the municipality. 
 
a) The official mark-up price 
 
 One of the main results of the theoretical model is that retailers’ incentives to cheat are 
inversely related with the official mark-up price (i.e., the difference between the official price and 
marginal cost). In order to test this proposition empirically there should be a change in the mark-
up price at some point in time. Fortunately, in January of 2006 PEMEX, PROFECO and the 
                                                                                                                                                              
in the south region are Guerrero, Hidalgo, Oaxaca, Puebla and Tlaxcala. The VMC includes information of Distrito 
Federal (DF) and 10 municipalities of the state of México that are part of the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City. 
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Mexican taxing agency, Servicio de Administración Tributaria (SAT), announce a joint effort to 
verify and evaluate gasoline retail services (see PEMEX, 2006). As a consequence of this 
announcement, PEMEX signs a new contract with retailers increasing the mark-up price from 
5.92 to 6.5%. Although in principle this event allows testing the prediction of the model, it is 
important to take into account that the contract contains other clauses that may affect retailers’ 
decisions but their effect cannot be separated from this change in the mark-up price. 
The dataset that considers the test as unit of observation contains the identification 
number of the retail gasoline station, the difference between the amount of gasoline requested by 
the simulated consumer and the amount dispensed by the retailer, as well as the date in which the 
test is performed. Fortunately, tests are performed both before and after the signature of the new 
contract. 
 
FIGURE 3.- Distribution of gasoline shortage in the PCS sample before and after the new 
contract. 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of gasoline shortage in the PCS sample before and after 
the announcement of the new contract. Although it is possible that some of the retailers had not 
signed the new contract by the time in which they were tested, we observe a difference in the 
distribution of gasoline shortage of the tests performed before and after the announcement. Most 
of the difference is observed in the probability that retailers dispense the correct amount of 
gasoline. Before the announcement, the probability that a retailer dispenses the correct amount of 
gasoline is about 50%. After the announcement, this probability increases up to 73%. 
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Table 2 shows that the mean shortage in the tests performed before the signature of the 
new contract is 2.5%, while the mean shortage afterwards is 1.3%. A test of means indicates that 
mean shortages are statistically different before and after the signature of the new contract. It 
follows that Mexican retail gasoline stations, on average, dispense a smaller shortage after the 
new contract allowed them to have a larger mark-up price.11  
 
TABLE 2. Average shortage before and after the new contract 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
b) The intensity of competition 
 
 Another result of the theoretical model says that the retailers’ incentives to cheat are 
inversely related with the intensity of competition. In order to test this prediction, we construct a 
variable that measures the intensity of competition in different markets. Since there is no 
information about revenues of retailers at the firm level, the measure of competition in this paper 
is the number of firms in relation to the size of the market at the municipality. 
The PCS database is combined with other sources of information like Quien es Quien en 
las Gasolineras (QQG) published by PROFECO and the Censos Económicos 2004 (CE) 
published by Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI). The CE database includes 
total revenues of retail gasoline and diesel services at the municipality level. This is the main 
reason to build a database where the unit of observation is the municipality. However, the cost of 
                                                 
11 According to Levene’s test, the variances of the two periods are different. Hence, the estimated statistic for the test 
of means is 4.19. 
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doing this is losing some observations when PCS and CE data are merged. In particular, the CE 
does not provide data on revenues of retail gasoline and diesel services for 10 municipalities in 
the PCS sample.12 As mentioned before, the unit of observation in the new database is the 
municipality and the variables are defined in Table 3. The variable GS will be considered the 
measure of competition in this paper. 
 
TABLE 3. Definition of variables  
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
Table 4 shows that on average the gasoline shortage is 1.68% while the median is 0.481%. 
In other words, the average liter in the municipalities is actually 983.2 milliliters while the 
median liter is 995.19 milliliters. Moreover, according to Norm 005, the average shortage is 
above the allowed tolerance. Similarly, on average there are 0.062 retailers per million of pesos 
sold in the municipality. That is, the average revenues of retailer gas stations are over 16 million 
pesos per year. 
 
TABLE 4. Descriptive statistics  
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
A regression analysis is conducted to test whether more intense competition reduces the 
incentive that retail gasoline stations have to cheat. In particular, equation (10) is estimated to 
                                                 
12 The municipalities are Tlalpujahua in Michoacan, Pedro Escobedo in Queretaro, Cuautlancingo and San Matías 
Tlalancaleca in Puebla and Chapantongo, San Agustín Tlaxiaca, Santiago Tulantepec, Tepetitlán, Tetepango and 
Zempoala in Hidalgo. 
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find out whether the intensity of competition explains the gasoline shortage in municipalities. 
According to the theoretical model, coefficient β2 should be negative. 
Shortagei = β0 + β1* Sizei + β2* GSi + β3* Southi+ β4* VMCi + εi. (10) 
 
The variables related to geographic location are included to control for differences in 
moral or social costs that may exist in different regions of the country. Note that the role of the 
authority may vary between regions. That is, the probability of receiving a sanction does not have 
to be homogeneous across the country. 
Since a high percentage (45.6%) of municipalities in the PCS sample dispense on average 
the amount of gasoline that consumers pay for, the dependent variable is considered as censored. 
Therefore, Table 5 shows the estimated parameters using the Tobit model. Additionally, this table 
presents Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) results for the non censored sample. 
 
TABLE 5. Estimation results  
INSERT TABLE 5 
 
It is not difficult to note that the signs of the parameters are the same in the two estimated 
versions. In addition, all the parameters are significantly different from zero at least in one of the 
models. However, only coefficients for GS and South are statistically different from zero in both 
empirical models. In other words, these estimates are not affected by the method of estimation. 
The results indicate that more retailers per million of liters sold in a municipality reduce the 
average shortage. That is, as the theoretical model predicts, more competition reduces the 
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incentives to cheat. Note also that retailers in the south region of Mexico dispense about 2 
percentage points less gasoline per liter than retailers in the rest of the country. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The highly regulated gasoline market in Mexico provides a unique setting to study the 
relation between fraud and competition. In this country, there is only one gasoline brand and no 
price competition. All retail stations must buy and sell gasoline distributed by PEMEX at fixed 
common prices. However, retailers located in different places may have incentives to set different 
prices depending on the characteristics of their local markets. 
This paper studies the incentives that retail gas stations in Mexico have to cheat both 
theoretically and empirically. On the one hand, this work extends the model developed by Salop 
(1979) to study the incentives of retailers to dispense less gasoline than what consumers pay for, 
taking into account the characteristics of this market in Mexico. On the other hand, the 
predictions of the model are tested with public information from the PCS conducted by 
PROFECO. 
Although all the retail gasoline stations charge official prices, dispensing incomplete liters 
is a mean by which retailers overprice. It is interesting to note that, in spite of other relevant 
incentives, this overprice responds to observable market conditions as the theory would predict. 
For instance, it would be expected to observe that retailers facing less intense competition set 
higher prices than those facing more intense competition. However, since firms are not able to 
modify prices according to market conditions, they are tempted to do it by dispensing incomplete 
liters. Similarly, an increment in the official mark-up price reduces retailers’ incentive to 
overprice by dispensing incomplete liters. 
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TABLE 1. 
Region Tests % Municipalities % 
North 37 9.4 13 12.6 
Central 181 45.9 29 28.2 
South 88 22.3 40 38.8 
VMC 88 22.3 21 20.4 
Source: PCS (2007) 
VMC is the Valley of Mexico City 
 
TABLE 2. 
 Tests Average shortage Standard deviation 
Before 168 2.544 3.182 
After 226 1.306 2.479 
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TABLE 3. 
Variable Definition Source 
Shortagei 
Mean percentage gasoline shortage according to the sample in 
municipality i. 
PCS 
Sizei 
Mean number of gas pumps at gas stations included in the sample 
in municipality i. 
PCS and 
QQG 
GSi 
Retail gasoline stations per million of pesos of gasoline sold in 
municipality i.  
QQG 
and CE 
South 
Dummy variable that indicates if the municipality is in the south 
region. 
PCS and 
QQG 
VMC 
Dummy variable that indicates if the municipality is in the Valley 
of Mexico City. 
PCS and 
QQG 
 
 
TABLE 4. 
Variable Mean Median Standard deviation
Shortage 1.683 0.481 2.273 
Size 22.278 20.000 9.819 
GS 0.062 0.033 0.179 
South 0.388 0.000 0.490 
VMC 0.204 0.000 0.405 
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TABLE 5. 
Variable Tobit OLS 
Constant 
1.548 
(1.290) 
3.183 ** 
(1.109) 
Size 
– 0.080 * 
(0.044) 
– 0.029 
(0.039) 
GS 
– 18.198 **
(8.599) 
– 18.896 ** 
(7.124) 
South 
2.641 **
(0.837) 
1.979 ** 
(0.696) 
VMC 
2.875 **
(0.893) 
1.102 
(0.710) 
Number of observations 
Adjusted R2  
93 
0.207 
51 
0.222 
* Significant at 10% 
** Significant at 5 % 
 
